Political advertising and the Communications Act: tailored suit or old blanket? by Lewis, T
European Human Rights Law Review
2005
Political advertising and the Communications Act 2003: tailored suit or old
blanket?
Tom Lewis
Subject: Media and entertainment. Other related subjects: Human rights
Keywords: Broadcasting; Freedom of expression; Political activities; Political parties; Television
Legislation: Communications Act 2003 s.319 , s.321
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art.10
Human Rights Act 1998 s.3
Case: VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (24699/94) (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 4 (ECHR)
*E.H.R.L.R. 290 In the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights, political
expression receives a high degree of protection. Commercial expression, by contrast, receives far
lower levels of protection. In respect of political advertising in the broadcast media the current UK
regime inverts this position. Broadcast advertising for any political purpose is prohibited whereas
advertising for commercial purposes is permitted. In this article it is argued that the blanket ban on
political advertising in the broadcast media comprises a disproportionate interference with the right to
freedom of expression. Furthermore, since the Government has made a statement under s.19(1)(b) of
the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of the prohibition, it will be extremely difficult for the court to
use its interpretative powers under s.3 HRA or invoke doctrines of judicial deference to save the ban
from incompatibility with Art.10 ECHR.
Political advertising in the broadcast media
The use of the broadcast media for paid political advertising is prohibited by ss.319 and 321 of the
Communications Act 2003.1 Section 319(2)(g) imposes a duty on the new broadcasting regulator
OFCOM to ensure that political advertising is not included in television or radio services. Section
321(2) states (a) that an advertisement will contravene the prohibition if it is inserted “by or on behalf
of a body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature” or (b) if it is “directed towards a
political end”. These same terms were used in the current ban's predecessor contained in s.92 of the
Broadcasting Act 1990. Their breadth became apparent in R. v Radio Authority Ex p. Bull 2
*E.H.R.L.R. 291 in which the Court of Appeal upheld a refusal to broadcast a radio advertisement by
Amnesty International bringing attention to the genocide occurring in Rwanda. In the 2003 Act the
terms have been comprehensively defined to include inter alia : influencing the outcome of elections
or referenda, influencing governmental policy and bringing about changes of the law or influencing the
legislative process. These definitions include activity not just within the United Kingdom but anywhere
in the world. Furthermore, the definition includes “influencing public opinion on a matter which, in the
United Kingdom, is a matter of public controversy”.3
The stated reasons for the retention of the ban centre on the proposition that it is important not to let
wealthy interests buy up large slots of advertising time to fill with their own political messages. These
were summed up by Tessa Jowell M.P., Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport:
“By denying powerful interests the chance to skew political debate, the current ban safeguards the
public and democratic debate, and protects the impartiality of broadcasters.”4
The ECHR and political advertising
Freedom of expression is protected by Art.10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”). In particular, political expression has received a very high degree of protection from the
European Court of Human Rights due to its importance in maintaining democracy: “freedom of
political debate is at the very core of the concept of democratic society which prevails throughout the
Convention”.5 It is not just narrow, party political expression that falls within this higher echelon. The
European Court of Human Rights has observed that “there is no warrant in its case law for
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distinguishing … between political discussion and discussion of other matters of public concern”.6
One of the main indices of the high value placed on political expression is that a narrow margin of
appreciation is accorded to states as to what restrictions can be imposed under Art.10(2).7 Other
forms of arguably lower value expression, notably commercial speech, are accorded lower levels of
protection.8
The European Court of Human Rights considered the specific issue of political advertising on
television in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland. 9 The applicant, a vegetarian organisation,
produced a short film comparing the idyllic life of wild pigs in the forest with the traumatised existence
of their factory farmed counterparts, and urging consumers to “eat less meat”. The Swiss broadcaster
refused to screen the film on the ground that it was a “political” advertisement banned by Swiss law.
The Swiss court upheld the ban noting inter alia that it helped prevent financially powerful groups
*E.H.R.L.R. 292 from obtaining political advantage and fostered equality of opportunity among
different forces in society.
VgT applied to the European Court of Human Rights claiming a breach of Art.10. The Court accepted
that the desire to safeguard the “formation of public opinion … from the pressures of powerful
financial groups” might fall within the “protection of the … rights of others” aspect of Art.10(2).10 The
Court then considered the question of whether the ban was “necessary in a democratic society”, i.e.
whether it corresponded to a pressing social need, was proportionate and whether the reasons
adduced were “relevant and sufficient”.11 The Swiss authorities did have a certain margin of
appreciation on the question of whether there was a pressing social need to broadcast an
advertisement--indeed this was “particularly essential … in an area as complex and fluctuating as
advertising”. But the expression here was not regular commercial advertising in the sense that it was
intended to persuade the public to buy a particular product. Rather it “reflected controversial opinions
pertaining to modern society in general”. Indeed the very reason the advert was banned was because
it was regarded as “political”. Because of this the state's margin of appreciation was reduced. In view
of the fact that the primary reason for the ban was that it was intended to prevent wealthy commercial
groups from skewing the political process, and given that the organisation here was patently not such
a group, the Government's reason could not have been “relevant and sufficient” to justify this
particular restriction. Further, there was no prohibition of political advertising in the print media. This
may have been due to the fact that television “had a stronger effect on the public on account of its
dissemination and immediacy” but the Court said that it must have meant that the prohibition could
not have been of a “particularly pressing nature”.12 Thus the ban constituted a violation of Art.10.
This was the European backdrop to the UK Government's decision to retain the ban on broadcast
political advertising. It meant that the Government had to take the serious and unusual step of making
a statement under s.19(1)(b) HRA.13
Section 19
Section 19 HRA requires that Ministers responsible for government Bills either make a written
statement that in their view the Bill is compatible with Convention rights (s.19(1)(a)) or that, even
though they are unable to make such a statement, they wish the House to proceed with the Bill
anyway (s.19(1)(b)). In order for a s.19(1)(a) statement to be made it must be “more likely than not
that the provisions … will stand up to challenge on Convention grounds”.14 If a s.19(1)(b) statement is
made this does not necessarily mean “that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible … but [merely]
*E.H.R.L.R. 293 that the Minister is unable to make a statement of compatibility”.15 Consistent with
the intention to retain parliamentary sovereignty, s.19 clearly envisages that legislation may be
passed which is not human rights compatible, although during the passage of the Human Rights Bill
itself it was stated that ministers would “want to make a positive statement whenever possible”.16
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, having earlier voiced serious concerns about the ban on
broadcast political advertising,17 eventually accepted that the Government's action did “not evince a
lack of respect for human rights, and [was] legitimate in the circumstances”. Particularly influential
was the Government's promise that, if the section were to be found incompatible with Convention
rights, it would introduce remedial legislation.18
The likely approach of the courts
The Communications Act, with its s.19(1)(b) statement, is an invitation to legal challenge from any
disgruntled group with a “political” programme which it wishes to publicise over the air waves. The
Government stressed that the s.19(1)(b) statement did not mean that it believed the Bill to be
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incompatible with the ECHR and that it would “mount a robust defence if it were legally challenged”.19
Assuming that it is accepted that freedom of expression is being restricted in order to pursue the
legitimate aim of safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process by preventing the undue
influence of wealthy groups, the key question in any future challenge will be whether the ban is
“necessary in a democratic society”--in particular whether it is proportionate.20 In R. v Secretary of
State for the Home Department Ex p. Daly, Lord Steyn elaborated upon the meaning of
proportionality under the HRA and adopted a three-stage test: whether (i) the legislative objective is
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the
legislative object are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right are no more
than is necessary to accomplish the objective.21
Even if the ban were found to satisfy stages (i) and (ii) of the test, it is very difficult to see how it could
be found to pass muster under stage (iii).22 There are various ways in which Parliament could have
restricted the use of political broadcasts in a more finely tuned way, short of a wholesale ban, and yet
still achieved the objective of preventing wealthy interests skewing the political process. For example
there could be *E.H.R.L.R. 294 restrictions on airtime allowed or the imposition of spending limits.23
Even to have inserted the word “party” before the word “political” would have effected a more finely
tailored approach and would have permitted a much wider range of groups to express their views
whilst still meeting the legislative objective.
In the free speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada it has been held, under the
“minimal impairment” doctrine, that:
“ … full prohibition will only be constitutionally acceptable … where the government can show that
only a full prohibition will enable it to achieve its objective. Where … no evidence is adduced to show
that a partial ban would be less effective than a total ban, the justification required … to save the
violation of free speech is not established.”24
It is submitted that this approach is apposite to the United Kingdom and, if adopted, would result in
the ban being held to be a disproportionate interference with Art.10.
One possible basis for a governmental “robust defence” of the ban would be to distinguish VgT :
under Swiss law there was a prohibition on broadcast political advertising but there were no
alternative means for political parties to broadcast their policies. The United Kingdom, by contrast,
has a system of free Party Political Broadcasts available to political parties who meet certain criteria
as to the number of candidates fielded.25 Thus overall the blanket ban on broadcast political
advertising is compensated for by such free airtime.26
It is submitted that this argument does not fully address the problem. Take, for example, an
organisation like VgT or Amnesty which has a “political” programme, but which would not qualify for a
free Party Political Broadcast. It will be completely denied access to the broadcast media if its
proposed broadcast falls within the broad parameters of s.321(3)(a)-(g). It is no answer to the specific
complaint of such a group that its expressive rights have been infringed to say that the system overall
is generally compliant. Indeed it could be argued that such organisations are discriminated against
because some registered parties do have free access to at least some form of broadcast media
airtime--but other groups, wishing to convey a “political” message, have no access whatsoever.27
A right to broadcast?
One argument that any challenger of s.321 may have to overcome will be that, as Lord Hoffmann
stated, obiter, in ProLife, there “is no human right to use a television channel”. This, he said, did not
mean that Art.10 had no application to broadcasting but it did mean that, “instead of being a right not
to be prevented from expressing one's opinions, [Art.10 became] a right to a fair consideration of
being afforded the *E.H.R.L.R. 295 opportunity to do so; a right not to have one's access to public
media denied on discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable grounds”.28 Thus the standard of review in
cases involving denial of access to the broadcasting media will be less stringent than in other free
speech cases where Art.10 is fully engaged.
It is true that the European Commission on Human Rights has stated that Art.10 “cannot be taken to
include a general and unfettered right … [of] access to broadcasting time”.29 However the approach of
the European Court of Human Rights in VgT was to hold that a “refusal to broadcast … amounted to
an ‘interference by public authority’ in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Art.10”.30 Similarly in
Murphy v Ireland, a case concerning the Irish ban on religious advertising, a different section of the
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Court considered that:
“ … the matter essentially at issue in the … case [was] the applicant's exclusion from broadcasting an
advertisement, an issue concerning primarily the regulation of his means of expression … Article 10
protects not only the content and substance of information but also the means of dissemination since
any restriction on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information.”31
Thus, whatever the precise relationship between Art.10 and broadcasting, whatever the answer to the
question “does Art.10 confer a right to broadcast?”, the European Court of Human Rights has treated
denial of broadcasting space as an “interference” with expression.
The contention that those denied broadcasting time should not be entitled to full proportionality review
under Art.10(2) but rather a diminished level of protection (of not being denied access on
discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable grounds) seems not to be in accord with the approach of the
European Court of Human Rights in recent cases. In referring to its own “supervisory jurisdiction” in
VgT the Court stressed that its supervision was not
“ … limited to ascertaining whether the respondent state exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully
and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference … in the light of the case as a
whole and determine whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the
reasons adduced by the national authorities were relevant and sufficient. ”32 (emphasis added)
In Murphy the Court stated that “[n]o restriction on freedom of expression … can be compatible with
Article 10 unless it satisfies, inter alia, the test of necessity as required by the second paragraph of
that Article”.33 Thus in both VgT and Murphy the European Court of Human Rights proceeded on the
basis that there had been a restriction of *E.H.R.L.R. 296 expression and that, in order to avoid a
finding of a violation, the state had to be able to justify it under Art.10(2).34
Under s.2 HRA domestic courts are obliged to take into account any decision of the European Court
of Human Rights. Whatever position is taken on the question of whether or not there is a “human right
to use a television channel”, it is submitted that any court considering the compatibility of s.321 would
be bound to consider whether the ban is “necessary in a democratic society” rather than whether it is
merely discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable.35
Can s.3 save the ban from incompatibility?
How then should a court deal with the ban if it were to be found prima facie incompatible with Art.10
using the ordinary canons of construction? Would it be appropriate for a court to use s.3 HRA and
adopt a strained interpretation of s.321 and thus render it compatible? Section 3(1) requires the court
“[s]o far as it is possible to do so” to read and give effect to all legislation in a way which is compatible
with Convention rights. Exactly how far the court is entitled to go in effecting this “command” 36 or
“strong adjuration” 37 has been a matter of some debate. The House of Lords has recently
reconsidered the issue in Ghaidan v Ghodin-Mendoza. Their Lordships agreed that s.3 may require
the court to depart from the intention of Parliament as expressed in unambiguous statutory wording.38
However the court may not go so far as to adopt a meaning that is “inconsistent with a fundamental
feature of the legislation … the meaning imported must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the
legislation”.39 Extra words may be implied but only where they “go with the grain of the legislation”.40
Given this test, it is unlikely that the court could legitimately use s.3 to read down, or read extra words
into, s.321(3) so as to achieve compatibility with Art.10. First, Parliament has provided an exhaustive
definition of “objects of a political nature” and *E.H.R.L.R. 297 “political ends”.41 The “underlying
thrust” of the section is to maintain an allencompassing prohibition. Reading down or reading in extra
words would very much go against “the grain”. Allied with this is the s.19(1)(b) statement itself. It
would be problematic for a court to adopt a “linguistically … strained”42 interpretation of s.321 so as to
achieve a Convention-compatible meaning when Parliament itself has passed it knowing that there
are grave doubts as to its compatibility. The court should not simply ignore this fact. It is surely likely
that a court would decide that the “fundamental feature” of the legislation was to prevent all forms of
broadcast “political” advertising. Given these factors, to use s.3 to achieve a Conventioncompliant
result would be regarded as a case not of interpretation but of “judicial vandalism”.43
A suitable case for deference?
There has been much judicial and academic consideration of judicial deference as a kind of domestic
counterpart to the margin of appreciation afforded by the European Court of Human Rights to national
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authorities.44 Put simply the argument goes that the courts should defer to the legislature or the
executive in certain cases due to their democratic credentials or greater institutional competence in
the matters under consideration. In his speech in Kebilene Lord Hope commented that:
“[The margin of appreciation] is not available to national courts when they are considering Convention
issues arising within their countries. But in the hands of national courts the Convention should be
seen as an expression of fundamental principles rather than as a set of mere rules. The questions
which the courts will have to decide in the application of these principles will involve questions of
balance between competing interests and issues of proportionality … in some circumstances it will be
appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will
defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or
decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention.”45
*E.H.R.L.R. 298 It might be argued that this would be an appropriate case in which the court should
accord deference to Parliament and find there to be no incompatibility: that it is the considered
decision of the democratically elected arm of government on the difficult and complex question of how
exactly to restrict the exercise of a qualified right in the interests of guarding the integrity of the United
Kingdom's democratic process.46
It is submitted, however, that deference should have no place in such a case for two reasons. First, if
deference is, in some way, an equivalent of the Strasbourg margin of appreciation doctrine then,
given the political character of the expression concerned and the importance of this in maintaining a
democratic society, any deference afforded should be very limited.47 The Government has recently
cited Murphy v Ireland 48 in support of its contention that “there are strong policy and legal grounds for
believing that the ban is compatible with Convention rights”.49 As noted above, Murphy concerned the
Irish ban on broadcast religious advertising. The European Court of Human Rights noted that a “wider
margin of appreciation is generally available when regulating expression in relation to matters liable to
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion”.50 It was this
margin that enabled the Court to distinguish Murphy from VgT 51 and find there to be no breach of
Art.10. Since the UK ban concerns political expression, it is submitted that only a very narrow margin
of appreciation would be accorded by the European Court of Human Rights. Concomitantly, a very
limited level of deference should be accorded by the domestic court.
Secondly, again, there is the s.19(1)(b) statement. The executive and the legislature have, in effect,
conceded (probable) incompatibility at the outset. Why should the court summon up deference out of
nowhere in order to find that legislation is compliant with rights standards when the very executive
which initiated it and the legislative body which passed it do not consider, on the balance of
probabilities, that such compliance exists? This would not be judicial deference but “judicial
avoidance”.52 It would be a mockery for a court to defer to a body on the basis of its democratic
credentials and expertise when that very body cannot even be more certain than not that its actions
are rights-compliant. The constitutionally correct thing to do would surely be for the court to accept the
considered view of the executive and Parliament and make a declaration of incompatibility under s.4
HRA.
*E.H.R.L.R. 299 In his speech in R. v A Lord Hope said, obiter, that s.19 statements were merely
expressions of opinion by the Minister. They were not binding on the court nor even did they have
persuasive authority.53 But, in the context of deference, it would surely be a dereliction of the court's
constitutional duty to uphold rights if it were to ignore a statement of the executive to the effect that a
provision is probably not compatible. Indeed under Pepper v Hart 54 this statement would be
admissible evidence as to the intention of the proponent of the Bill. To allow deference to enter the
equation would set a dangerous precedent. For it (the executive) would have stated that it cannot say,
on the balance of probabilities, that the measure is compliant and thereby is able to take the credit for
not having a cavalier attitude towards the protection of human rights. Yet at the same time it would be
taking advantage of the court's willingness to defer to its (barely tenable) opinion that the provision
might be compatible after all. In this context deference must be taken to be a single-edged sword
which allows the court to find legislation to be compatible but only where the legislature and
executive's considered view is that it is so.
Merely an opening gambit?
During the passage of the Human Rights Bill the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw said that
“Parliament and the judiciary must engage in a serious dialogue about the operation and development
of the rights in the Bill … this dialogue is the only way in which we can ensure the legislation is a living
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development that assists our citizens”.55 Perhaps s.321 can be seen as the opening gambit in a
conversation between the organs of governance about the essence of rights whose content is
“essentially contestable”.56 If this dialogue model is indeed apposite then the court should not half
close its ears to what the other parties are saying. Section 19(1)(b) is part of the conversation. For
this reason it should neither defer nor use extensive powers of interpretation under s.3 in order to find
compatibility when it is likely that none is there. Rather it should, if indeed the provision is found to be
incompatible, declare it so using s.4 HRA.
Conclusion
The impact of the current regime might be illustrated by way of examples: fast food corporations may
target television advertisements at children, yet an organisation campaigning against child obesity
may not; clothes and sports shoe companies may advertise their wares on television, yet groups
wishing to publicise the plight of workers in developing countries employed by such corporations may
not; supermarket chains may advertise the freshness of their “out of season” cherry tomatoes and
mange-tout peas, yet a group wishing to highlight the deleterious effects of the globalised economy
which facilitates this consumption may not.
In RJR McDonald McLachlin J. stated that “the tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the
courts must accord some leeway to the legislature”.57 But in s.321 of *E.H.R.L.R. 300 the
Communications Act it is fair to say that there has been no attempt to trim the cloth at all. Instead a
blanket has been cast over the problem. For the reasons outlined above it is highly likely that this
approach will be declared unacceptable either by the UK courts or, if not by them, the European Court
of Human Rights.
My thanks to Elspeth Berry, Simon Boyes, Peter Cumper, Catherine Lewis, Adrian Walters and an
anonymous referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors and omissions
remain my own.
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